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Abstract. For a number of elliptic curve-based cryptographic protocols,
it is useful and sometimes necessary to be able to encode a message (a bit
string) as a point on an elliptic curve in such a way that the message can
be efficiently and uniquely recovered from the point. This is for exam-
ple the case if one wants to instantiate CPA-secure ElGamal encryption
directly in the group of points of an elliptic curve. More practically rele-
vant settings include Lindell’s UC commitment scheme (EUROCRYPT
2011) or structure-preserving primitives.
It turns out that constructing such an encoding function is not easy in
general, especially if one wishes to encode points whose length is large rel-
ative to the size of the curve. There is a probabilistic, “folklore” method
for doing so, but it only provably works for messages of length less than
half the size of the curve.
In this paper, we investigate several approaches to injective encoding
to elliptic curves, and in particular, we propose a new, essentially opti-
mal geometric construction for a large class of curves, including Edwards
curves; the resulting algorithm is also quite efficient, requiring only one
exponentiation in the base field and simple arithmetic operations (how-
ever, the curves for which the map can be constructed have a point of
order two, which may be a limiting factor for possible applications). The
new approach is based on the existence of a covering curve of genus 2 for
which a bijective encoding is known.
Keywords: Elliptic Curve Cryptography, Injective Encoding, Algebraic
Curves
1 Introduction
Various cryptographic protocols based on the hardness of Diffie-Hellman-like
problems in a group G, such as ElGamal encryption [7] or Lindell’s recent
universally-composable commitment scheme [14], assume the existence of an
efficient (possibly randomized) algorithm f mapping messages m ∈ {0, 1}ℓ to
elements of G, in such a way that m can also be recovered efficiently from f(m).
For example, ElGamal encryption is a priori defined on group elements, so
that a message needs to be mapped to an element of G before encrypting it,
and mapped back to a bit string upon decryption. Similarly, such a function
f is an important ingredient for structure-preserving cryptography [1]: indeed,
inputs and outputs of structure-preserving primitives are all group elements;
this offers convenient composability properties, but to use e.g. commitments or
encryption on actual bit strings, a way to map strings to the group and conversely
is required.
Moreover, the size ℓ of supported bit strings should preferably be as close as
possible to the bit size of G to optimize bandwidth. We call such an algorithm
f an injective encoding.
For certain groups G, like multiplicative groups of finite fields or some su-
persingular elliptic curves, it is not difficult to construct injective encodings
achieving the optimal value of ℓ. On the other hand, for a general group G, it is
not obvious how to construct a function f with ℓ even super-logarithmic in the
size of G. In §2.3, we prove that this is not possible with a deterministic generic
group algorithm.
When G is the group of points of any elliptic curve over a finite field, one can
construct a probabilistic injective encoding with ℓ equal to about half of the size
of G, as we show in §2.4, but we do not know of provable constructions achieving
a better ℓ in general. Works on deterministic hashing to elliptic curves, such as
[17,11], typically do not help addressing this problem, as the functions they
construct are not injective, and it is not clear how to find a convenient subset
of their domain on which they become injective. Recently, however, a solution
was proposed by Farashahi [8] in the special case of Hessian elliptic curves over
finite fields Fq with q ≡ 2 (mod 3).
In §3, we propose an essentially optimal construction for all ordinary elliptic
curves over fields Fq with q ≡ 3 (mod 4) with group order divisible by 4; this in-
cludes the well-known Edwards curves studied by Edwards and Bernstein–Lange
[2], as well as twisted Huff curves, as studied by Joye et. al. [13]. Our construc-
tion is based on the bijective encoding from [10] to certain hyperelliptic curves of
genus 2, and on the observation from [12] that those curves are quadratic covers
of elliptic curves.
2 Injective encodings
2.1 Definition
To fix ideas, and although it is not essential for our main purpose, let us first
give a formal definition of what we mean by an “injective encoding”.
Let us say that a cyclic group family (Gk)k∈N consists in the data of a se-
quence of integers nk ≥ 1 converging to infinity, a sequence of integers sk ≥ 0
that is at most polynomial in log nk, and for each k, an efficiently computable
bijection σk between the cyclic group Z/nkZ of order nk and a set Gk ⊂ {0, 1}sk
of bit strings of length sk, as well as efficient algorithms:
⊕k : {0, 1}sk × {0, 1}sk → {0, 1}sk ∪ {⊥} ⊖k : {0, 1}sk → {0, 1}sk ∪ {⊥}
which induce on the Gk the group addition and negation obtained by transport
of structure via σk. Here, “efficient” means with a time complexity polynomial
in log nk (or equivalently, in sk).
For example, if qk is an increasing sequence of positive primes, we can con-
struct a cyclic group family Gk = F
∗
qk
with nk = qk − 1 and sk = O(log qk)
by representing invertible elements in Fqk as integers in {1, . . . , qk} (themselves
regarded as bit strings). Similarly, if E is an elliptic curve over Z[1/N ] with N
coprime with the qk’s such that E(Fqk) is cyclic for all k, we have a cyclic group
family Gk = E(Fqk) with nk = qk + O(
√
qk) and sk = O(log qk) obtained by
representing curve points in e.g. affine coordinates (with a special string for the
point at infinity).
Given such a cyclic group family (Gk) and a sequence of non negative integers
ℓk, we define an ℓk-injective encoding to (Gk) be the data consisting of a pair of
efficient, possibly randomized algorithms:
Fk : {0, 1}ℓk → Gk ⊂ {0, 1}sk Ik : {0, 1}sk → {0, 1}ℓk ∪ {⊥}
for all k, which satisfy Ik(Fk(m)) = m for all m ∈ {0, 1}ℓk with overwhelming
probability over the randomness involved. We will typically express ℓk in terms
of νk = ⌊log2 nk⌋, which is the optimal bound, in the sense that we clearly have
ℓk ≤ νk for all k by injectivity.
In what follows, the indices k, as well as references to sequences of integers
and groups, will be omitted most of the time for simplicity’s sake.
2.2 Some simple, optimal examples
Let p be an odd prime number. The bijection [1, p − 1] → F∗p yields an obvious
injective encoding to the multiplicative group G = F∗p which is optimal, in the
sense that ℓ = ν.
Similarly, we obtain an optimal injective encoding to the group of squares
G = (F∗p)
2 ⊂ F∗p from the bijection [1, p−12 ] → (F∗p)2 given by x 7→ x2. The
inversion algorithm I then computes the unique square root of an element
in (F∗p)
2 contained in [1, p−12 ]. This is sufficient to obtain IND–CPA ElGamal
encryption in the group (F∗p)
2 when p is a safe prime, assuming the Decisional
Diffie–Hellman assumption in that group (though one typically wouldn’t want to
use it for efficiency reasons). On the other hand, it is not clear how to construct
a close to optimal injective encoding to the subgroup of prime order q in F∗p
when p is a Diffie–Hellman prime p = 2r · q + 1.
Some elliptic curve groups also have optimal injective encodings. This is for
example the case for the supersingular elliptic curves given by an equation of
the form:
E : y2 = x3 + b
over a field Fq with q ≡ 2 (mod 3). Then, as observed e.g. by Boneh and Franklin
[4], the map Fq → E(Fp) \ {∞} given by u 7→
(
(u2 − b)1/3, u) is an efficient
bijection, and its inverse is clearly efficient as well. This gives, again, an optimal
injective encoding to G = E(Fq). Similarly, the genus 1 case of the construction
proposed in [10] provides an optimal injective encoding to supersingular elliptic
curves of the form:
E : y2 = x3 + ax
over fields Fq with q ≡ 3 (mod 4). However, we are not aware of any strictly
optimal injective encoding to groups of points of ordinary elliptic curves, or even
supersingular curves of embedding degree greater than 2.
2.3 Generic injective encodings
It is easy to construct ℓk-injective encodings to any cyclic group family (Gk)
provided that ℓk = O(log νk) (and of course ℓk ≤ νk for all k). Indeed, in that
case, the set {0, 1}ℓk of elements to be encoded contains only polynomially many
elements: therefore, Fk and Ik can be defined as mutually inverse dictionary
lookups for each k, and still be efficient. For example, we can define Fk to be
the restriction of σk to {0, 1, . . . , 2ℓk − 1} ⊂ Z/nkZ (coded as bit strings in the
obvious way), and Ik as a series of 2
ℓk successive comparisons. Moreover, Fk
and Ik are generic, in the sense that they only require black-box access to Gk
(see [15]).
On the other hand, if ℓk = ω(log νk), then it is easy to see that Fk and Ik
cannot be both generic for all k if the Fk’s are deterministic. Indeed, suppose
that it were the case. Since it doesn’t take any group element as input, Fk must
be of the form:
Fk(m) = σk
(
fk(m)
)
for some efficiently computable function fk : {0, 1}ℓk → Z/nkZ. Then, let S =
Fk({0, 1}ℓk) be the image of Fk. In the terminology of Shoup [18], the algorithm
fk ◦ Ik is a generic group algorithm for Z/nkZ on {0, 1}sk that computes the
discrete logarithm σ−1k (g) of any element g ∈ S with overwhelming probability
in poly(νk) steps, regardless of the choice of the bijection σk. As a result, by
Shoup’s argument in op. cit., we must have #S = poly(νk): a contradiction.
This means that deterministic injective encodings from sets of superlogarith-
mic bit size must use the particular representation of individual group elements.
We conjecture that no probabilistic generic ω(log ν)-injective encoding exists ei-
ther, although this seems less easy to establish.
2.4 Injective encodings to elliptic curves
For groups of points of arbitrary (even ordinary) elliptic curves over finite prime
fields, it is possible to construct ℓ-injective encodings for much larger values ℓ
than in the generic case. We describe one such construction here, which is more
or less folklore.
Let E be an elliptic curve over Fp (p ≥ 5) in short Weierstrass form, and ℓ
an integer such that ℓ ≤ (1/2 − ε) log2 p for some fixed constant ε ∈ (0, 1/2).
We define the encoding algorithm F : {0, 1}ℓ → E(Fp) as follows (this encoding
is probabilistic: it is not a map). To compute F (m), pick a random integer x
in [0, p− 1] whose least significant ℓ bits coincide with m. If there are points in
E(Fp) of abscissa x mod p, return one of those (at most two) points; otherwise,
start over. The inversion algorithm I then simply maps a point (x, y) ∈ E(Fp)
to the bit string m formed by the ℓ least significant bits of x.
To prove that this method works, it suffices to show that F terminates in
expected polynomial time on any input m. We obtain the following, more precise
result.
Theorem 1. If p is large enough, the expected number of iterations in F on
any input is less than 3.
Proof. Let P (m) be the success probability of F on input m after a single
iteration; in other words, P (m) is the probability that a random integer x in
[0, p− 1] whose least significant ℓ bits coincide with m is the abscissa of a point
in E(Fp). Since for each such x there are at most two corresponding points in
E(Fp), we have:
P (m) ≥ 1
2
· #{(x, y) ∈ E(Fp) | lsbℓ(x) = m}
#{x ∈ [0, p− 1] | lsbℓ(x) = m} (1)
where lsbℓ(x) denotes the bit string formed by the ℓ least significant bits of x.
Clearly we have
#{x ∈ [0, p− 1] | lsbℓ(x) = m} ≤ 2−ℓ · p.
On the other hand, the value #{(x, y) ∈ E(Fp) | lsbℓ(x) = m} can be estimated
as in [9, §6]. It is the number of Fp-points (x, y) of E such that x/p is in a certain
interval of R/Z of length ≥ 2−ℓ ·(1−2/p) (because x can be of the form m+2ℓ ·r
at least for any r ∈ [0, ⌊p/2ℓ⌋−1]). But the values x/p in R/Z for (x, y) ∈ E(Fp)
are close to equidistributed. More precisely, we know from Bombieri’s bound on
character sums [3] that for any nontrivial additive character ψ of Fp, we have:
T (ψ) =
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
(x,y)∈E(Fp)\{∞}
ψ(x)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 4√p. (2)
As a result, the (1-dimensional) Erdo˝s–Tura´n–Koksma inequality [6, Th. 1.21]
gives, for any interval I ⊂ R/Z of length L and any positive integer H < p:∣∣∣∣∣
#{(x, y) ∈ E(Fp) \ {∞} | xp ∈ I}
N
− L
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 3H + 1 + 3N
H∑
h=1
T (ψh)
h
where ψh is the additive character x 7→ e2iπhx/p and N = #E(Fp)\{∞}. Setting
H =
√
p− 1, we get, in view of (2):
#{(x, y) ∈ E(Fp) \ {∞} | x
p
∈ I} ≥ L ·N − 3N√
p
− 3 · 4√p log√p
≥ L · p− 2L√p− 3√p− 6− 6√p log p
≥ L · p− 12√p log p
since |N − p| ≤ 2√p by the Hasse bound. Plugging this estimate back into (1),
we finally obtain:
P (m) ≥ 1
2
· 2
−ℓ(1− 2/p)p− 12√p log p
2−ℓ · p =
1
2
− 1
p
− 6 log p
pε
since ℓ ≤ (1/2 − ε) log2 p. Hence, the expected number of iteration in F is
1/P (m) ≤ 3 for large enough p as required. ⊓⊔
Thus, we can construct ℓ-injective encodings to elliptic curves over prime
fields for ℓ = (1/2− ε)ν: this is much better than the logarithmic bound we get
in the generic case, but this still falls short of optimality by a constant factor
greater than 2. It is conceivable that the same algorithm does in fact work with
a larger ℓ still, possibly as large as (1 − ε)ν or even ν − logO(1) ν; we doubt
that current results on the distribution of points on elliptic curves are sufficient
to prove that the algorithm terminates on all inputs on those cases, however
(though it might be possible to bound its complexity on average over all inputs
m).
The only injective encoding to ordinary elliptic curves in the literature achiev-
ing a better bound is, to our knowledge, the one proposed by Farashahi in [8].
It applies to Hessian curves (i.e. elliptic curves with a rational point of order 3)
over fields Fq with q ≡ 2 (mod 3), and achieves ℓ = ν − 1, a single bit short
of optimal. In the next sections, we construct a similar deterministic injective
encoding to all ordinary elliptic curves over fields Fq with q ≡ 3 (mod 4) with
group order divisible by 4, also achieving ℓ = ν − 1.
3 Our new elliptic curve encoding
3.1 Main construction
As mentioned in the introduction, we now construct a new injective encoding for
a large family of elliptic curves that are covered by certain hyperelliptic curves
of genus 2.
More precisely, fix some finite field Fq with q ≡ 3 (mod 4), and constants
c ∈ Fq\{−1, 0, 1}, δ = ±1. We consider the following hyperelliptic curve of genus
2:
Hδc : y
2 = f(x) = δx5 +
(
c2 +
1
c2
)
· x3 + δx. (3)
The main result of this paper can then be stated as follows.
Theorem 2. The following properties hold.
1. In addition to the hyperelliptic involution τ : (x, y) 7→ (x,−y), Hδc admits an
additional involution σ defined over Fq and given by σ(x, y) = (1/x, y/x
3).
2. The quotient curve Hδc /〈σ〉 is an elliptic curve isomorphic to:
Eδc : y
2 = x3 − 4δx2 + δ(c+ δ/c)2x. (4)
The quotient map G : Hδc → Eδc commutes with hyperelliptic involutions, in
the sense that if we denote by τ ′ the involution of Eδc given by (x, y) 7→
(x,−y), we have G ◦ τ = τ ′ ◦G.
3. There is a well-defined map F : Fq → Hδc (Fq) given by
F (t) =
(
χq(f(t)) · t, χq
(
ct+ δt3/c
)√
χq(f(t)) · f(t)
)
, (5)
where χq(·) is the quadratic character of F∗q (extended by zero to all of Fq)
and
√· is the usual square root on the squares in Fq (namely exponentiation
by (q + 1)/4). This map F satisfies, for all t ∈ F∗q :
F (1/t) = σ
(
F (t)
)
and F (−t) = τ(F (t)).
4. Fix I ⊂ Fq a subset of Fq with (q−1)/2 elements such that I∩(−I) = ∅ and
−1 6∈ I, and let I0 be the set obtained from I by removing all elements of the
form 1−t1+t for t a root of f , and adding 0 and 1. Then, the restriction to I0 of
the map Finj : u 7→ G
(
F
(
1−u
1+u
))
is injective, and can be computed very effi-
ciently as can its inverse (computing either of them costs one exponentiation
in the base field and a few multiplications and divisions).
Proof. The first claim is clear. To prove the second claim, the idea is to write
the equation of Hδc in terms of a rational function that transforms in a simple
way under σ, such as t = 1+x1−x , which satisfies σ
∗t = −t. Concretely, we observe
that (when t is regarded as an indeterminate over Fq):
(1 + t)6f
(
1− t
1 + t
)
= δ(1− t)5(1 + t) + ω(1− t3)(1 + t)3 + δ(1− t)(1 + t)5
= −(2δ + ω)t6 − (10δ − 3ω)t4 + (10δ − 3ω)t2 + (2δ + ω).
where ω = c2+1/c2. From this relation, it is easily verified that Hδc is isomorphic
to the curve:
H ′ : v2 = −(2δ + ω)t6 − (10δ − 3ω)t4 + (10δ − 3ω)t2 + (2δ + ω),
a pair of mutually inverse rational maps between Hδc and H
′ being given by:
Hδc −→ H ′
(x, y) 7−→
(
1− x
1 + x
, y
( 2
1 + x
)3)
;(
1− t
1 + t
,
v
(1 + t)3
)
←− [ (t, v).
Moreover, the involution σ on Hδc corresponds, under this isomorphism, to the
involution σ′ : (x, y) 7→ (−x, y) of H ′, and hence Hδc /〈σ〉 ∼= H ′/〈σ′〉 is isomorphic
to:
E′ : v2 = h(u) = −(2δ + ω)u3 − (10δ − 3ω)u2 + (10δ − 3ω)u+ (2δ + ω).
Now, since h(1−u) = (2δ+ω)x3−16δx2+16δx, we see by applying the change of
coordinates (u, v) 7→ (1−u, v) and then the scaling (u, v) 7→ ((2δ+ω)u/4, (2δ+
ω)v/8
)
that E′ is itself isomorphic to
Eδc : y
2 = x3 − 4δx2 + δ(2δ + ω)x
as required (this is the same as (4) since 2δ + ω = (c+ δ/c)2). Furthermore, the
discriminant of this curve is:
∆ = 16(c+ δ/c)4 · (16− 4δ(c+ δ/c)2) = −64δ(c+ δ/c)4 · (c− δ/c)2,
which is necessarily non-zero since c 6= ±1 and −1 is a non quadratic residue.
It follows that Eδc is indeed an elliptic curve. Finally, each of the maps in the
diagram Hδc → H ′ → E′ → Eδc commutes with hyperelliptic involutions, so the
compose map G does as well.
We now turn to the third claim. For any t ∈ Fq, χq(f(t)) · f(t) has a square
image under χq so it is itself a square, and thus equation (5) correctly defines
F (t) = (x, y) as a point in F2q. We have to check that it lies in H
δ
c (Fq). Suppose
first that f(t) 6= 0. In that case, we cannot have ct+ δt3/c = 0 since:
(ct+ δt3/c) · (ct2 + δ/c) = c2t3 + δt+ δt5 + t3/c2 = f(t) 6= 0.
Therefore, the first factor in y is ±1, and thus:
y2 = χq(f(t)) · f(t) = f (χq(f(t)) · t) = f(x)
so that F (t) ∈ Hδc (Fq) as required. On the other hand, if f(t) = 0, we get
x = y = 0 and again F (t) ∈ Hδc (Fq).
It remains to show that F (1/t) = σ
(
F (t)
)
and F (−t) = τ(F (t)) for all t 6= 0.
The latter is easy:
F (−t) =
(
χq(f(−t)) · (−t), χq
(−ct− δt3/c)√χq(f(−t)) · f(−t)
)
=
(
χq(f(t)) · t, −χq
(
ct+ δt3/c
)√
χq(f(t)) · f(t)
)
= τ
(
F (t)
)
.
To obtain the former, note that f(1/t) = f(t)/t6. In particular, f(t) and f(1/t)
have the same quadratic residue. Moreover, if we let α(t) = χq
(
ct+ δt3/c
)
, we
have:
α(t) · α(1/t) = χq
(
(ct+ δt3/c) · (ct2 + δ/c)/t3) = χq(f(t)/t3) .
Now write F (t) = (x, y) and F (1/t) = (x′, y′). We have:
x′ = χq(f(t)) · 1
t
=
1
x
y′ = α(1/t) ·
√
χq(f(t))
f(t)
t6
= α(1/t) ·
√
χq(f(t)) f(t) · 1
t3
χq
(
1/t3
)
= α(1/t) · α(t)y · χq
(
t3
)
t3
= y · χq(f(t)) 1
t3
=
y
x3
,
hence F (1/t) = σ
(
F (t)
)
as required.
Regarding the fourth assertion of the theorem, the injectivity claim is a direct
consequence of Lemma 1 below. The efficiency claim for Finj follows from the
fact that F can be computed at the cost of one exponentiation in the base field,
some quadratic character evaluations4 and a few multiplications, while G is the
simple rational function described explicitly above. Similarly, computing G−1
costs one square root to lift a point from E′(Fq) back to H
′(Fq) and a few
arithmetic operations for the isomorphisms Eδc
∼= E′ and H ′ ∼= Hδc , whereas
the inverse of F (outside of the Weierstrass points of Hδc ) admits the following
simple expression:
F−1(x, y) = α(x) · χq(y) · x.
Indeed, if (x, y) = F (t), we have α(x)χq(y) = α(x)α(t) = χq(xt)·χq
(
c+ δx2/c
)2
=
χq(xt) since t
2 = x2. Hence the claim on the efficiency of F−1inj . ⊓⊔
Lemma 1. Let S ⊂ Fq be any subset of Fq containing no root of f , and such
that S ∩S−1 = ∅ (i.e. for all x ∈ S, 1/x 6∈ S). Then, the restriction of G ◦F to
S is injective. Moreover, the result still holds if we replace S by S ∪ {0, 1}.
Proof. Consider t, t′ ∈ S such that G(F (t)) = G(F (t′)). We must have either
F (t) = F (t′) or F (t) = σ
(
F (t′)
)
= F (1/t′).
In the latter case, we see in particular that the first coordinates of F (t) and
F (1/t′) coincide, so that t = ±1/t′. By definition of S, t = 1/t′ is excluded, so
we must have t = −1/t′. Now since G commutes with hyperelliptic involutions,
we can write:
G
(
F (t′)
)
= G
(
F (−1/t′)) = G(τF (1/t′)) = τ ′G(σF (t′)) = τ ′G(F (t′)).
Therefore, G
(
F (t′)
)
is a Weierstrass point on Eδc . Given the expression of G,
this implies that F (t′) is a Weierstrass point on Hδc , and hence that t
′ is a root
of f , which is a contradiction.
If on the other hand F (t) = F (t′), we see in particular by comparing the first
coordinates of F (t) and F (t′) that t′ = ±t. But since S contains no root of f ,
F (t) is not a Weierstrass point, so it is not equal to its image F (−t) under the
4 In fact, using the techniques from [10], they can be optimized away.
hyperelliptic involution τ . Hence t′ = −t is impossible, and we must have t = t′
as required.
Turning to the second claim, we compute the images of 0 and 1 under G ◦F .
We have G ◦ F (0) = G((0, 0)) = (0, 0) ∈ Eδc (Fq), and similarly, since f(1) =
(c+δ/c)2, we find that G◦F (1) = G((1, c+δ/c)) = ((c+δ/c)2/4, (c+δ/c)3/8) ∈
Eδc (Fq). In particular, these images are distinct. Moreover, it follows from the
above that for all t ∈ S, G(F (t)) is never a Weierstrass point on Eδc , and
hence is always distinct from G
(
F (0)
)
. Finally, if there was some t ∈ S such
that G
(
F (t)
)
= G
(
F (1)
)
, then, using the same argument as above, we would
have t = ±1 (or 1/t = ±1, which is equivalent), and this is impossible since
S ∩ S−1 = ∅. ⊓⊔
3.2 Description of the target curves
The result of Theorem 2 is an injective encoding Finj to any elliptic curve of
the form Eδc . Its range I0 is of cardinality exactly (q − 1)/2 + δ. Indeed, we can
write f(x) for x 6= 0 as x3 · (cx2 + δ/c) · (c/x2 + δ/c). When δ = +1, none of
the factors can vanish for x 6= 0, so 0 is the only root of f . Therefore, the range
I0 of Finj is of cardinality (q + 1)/2; when q is prime, we can take the interval
[0, (q − 1)/2]. On the other hand, when δ = −1, the roots of f are 0,±c,±1/c,
and I0 is then of cardinality (q+1)/2− 2 = (q− 3)/2; when q is prime, it is the
interval [0, (q − 1)/2] from which one has removed ±t,±1/t where t = 1−c1+c .
In both cases, we see that the size of the set from which we encode is a single
bit less than the cardinality #Eδc (Fq) = q + O(
√
q) of the target group. Hence,
we do get a deterministic (ν − 1)-injective encoding as stated.
It is desirable to have a simple description of the class of curves Eδc for which
we obtain this encoding. It is given by the following theorem.
Theorem 3. Denoting Eδc by E
+
c or E
−
c for δ = 1 and δ = −1 respectively, the
following hold:
1. The point (0, 0) is the only rational point of exact order 2 on E+c and it is
divisible by 2. In particular, the rational 4-torsion subgroup of E+c is equal
to Z/4Z.
2. All three points of exact order 2 on E−c are rational, but (0, 0) is not divisible
by 2. In particular, E−c has full rational 2-torsion, and the rational 4-torsion
of is equal to (Z/2Z)2 or Z/2Z × Z/4Z, depending on whether one of the
other points of order 2 is divisible by 2.
3. Any ordinary elliptic curve over Fq with rational 4-torsion equal to Z/4Z is
isomorphic to E+c or to its twist for some c.
4. Any ordinary elliptic curve over Fq with full rational 2-torsion is isomorphic
to E−c or to its twist for some c.
Proof. Statements 1 and 2. The curve Eδc obviously has a rational point of exact
order 2, namely (0, 0). When δ = +1, it is the only one; indeed, the trinomial
x2−4x+(c+1/c)2 has discriminant 16−4(c+1/c)2 = −4(c−1/c)2 which is a non
quadratic residue. On the other hand, if δ = −1, all three points of exact order 2
are rational, since x2+4x−(c−1/c)2 has discriminant 16+4(c−1/c)2 = 4(c+1/c)2
which is a square.
Furthermore, there is a rational point P such that [2]P = (0, 0) if and only
if δ = +1. To see that, it suffices to show that there is a line through (0, 0)
which is tangent to the curve, since the intersection point will clearly satisfy the
requirement. Now if y = tx is a line through (0, 0), the other intersection points
with the curve have their abscissa given by t2x = x2 − 4δx + δ(c + δ/c)2, and
the line is tangent when the discriminant of this quadratic equation vanishes,
i.e. when t satisfies:
(4δ + t2)2 = 4δ
(
c+
δ
c
)2
.
There is no solution when δ = −1 since the right-hand side is not square. On
the other hand, when δ = +1, this is equivalent to:
t2 = −4± 2
(
c+
1
c
)
and this equation has a solution for one of the two possible signs, because
(−4+
2(c + 1/c)
) · (−4 − 2(c + 1/c)) = −4(c − 1/c)2 is a non quadratic residue, and
hence exactly one of the factors must be square.
Thus, in all cases, we see that the curve admits a rational subgroup of order
4. In fact, the rational 4-torsion is of order 4 or 8: namely Z/4Z when δ = +1,
and (Z/2Z)2 or Z/2Z × Z/4Z when δ = −1 depending on whether one of the
points of order 2 other than (0, 0) is divisible by two. This completes the proof
of statements 1 and 2.
Statement 3. Conversely, we now prove that, up to a quadratic twist, any ordinary
elliptic curve over Fq with a point of order 4 and only one point of order 2 is
isomorphic to E+c for some c. Indeed, let E be any such elliptic curve. We can
put E in Weierstrass form, translate so that the point of order 2 is (0, 0), and
scale the coordinates to get an equation of the form:
E : y2 = x3 ± 4x2 + ax
for some a ∈ Fq, with a 6= 0, 4 since the right-hand side must have no double
root. Note that the nontrivial quadratic twist of E has the same equation, only
with the sign of the coefficient of x2 reversed.
Since there is a single point of order 2, the discriminant 16 − 4a of the
trinomial x2± 4x+ a must be a non quadratic residue. Hence, a− 4 is a square.
Moreover, (0, 0) is divisible by two: therefore, there exists a t such that the line
of slope t through (0, 0) is tangent to the curve. This t is such that the equation
t2x = x2± 4x+ a has a double root, so we must have (−t2± 4)2− 4a = 0, hence
a is a square. And the discriminant of the trinomial c2 −√a · c+ 1 is a− 4, so
there is a c ∈ Fq \ {0,±1} such that a = (c+ 1/c)2. This shows that E is either
E+c or its quadratic twist as required.
Statement 4. Finally, consider any elliptic curve E over Fq with full rational
2-torsion. As above, we can put E in the form:
E : y2 = x3 ± 4x2 + ax (6)
for some a ∈ Fq with a 6= 0, 4, and since the right-hand side splits in linear
factors, 4 − a is a square. Assume for the moment that a is a non quadratic
residue, then E is isomorphic to either E−c or its twist. Indeed, −a is then a
square, and the discriminant of the trinomial c2−√−a · c− 1 is −a+4 which is
a square as well; hence, we can find c ∈ Fq \ {0,±1} such that a = −(c− 1/c)2,
as required.
To complete the proof, we need to show that we can always find a Weierstrass
equation (6) for E such that a is a non quadratic residue. To see this, first observe
that if we start from a Weierstrass equation of the form
y2 = x(x− λ)(x− µ) (7)
for E (which certainly exists) and scale the coefficients to get (6), the scaling
factor s satisfies λ+ µ = ±4s2 and λµ = as4, so that:
a =
16λµ
(λ+ µ)2
.
Now clearly, starting from (7), we can translate the origin to one of the other
two points of order 2, and get one of the other two Weierstrass forms:
y2 = x′(x′ + λ)(x′ + λ− µ) or y2 = x′′(x′′ + µ)(x′′ + µ− λ).
These correspond to the canonical form (6) with the coefficient of x equal to:
a′ =
16(−λ)(−λ+ µ)
(−2λ+ µ)2 , resp. a
′′ =
16(−µ)(−µ+ λ)
(−2µ+ λ)2 .
But at least one of a, a′ and a′′ must be a non quadratic residue, since:
χq(a · a′ · a′′) = χq(λµ · (−λ)(−λ+ µ) · (−µ)(−µ+ λ)) = −1.
This concludes the proof. ⊓⊔
Note that elliptic curves with rational 4-torsion equal to Z/4Z are birational
to Edwards curves x2+y2 = 1+dx2y2 with non square d [2]. Bernstein and Lange
showed that these curves are quite interesting for computation and cryptography,
as they admit a complete addition law, and admit the fastest arithmetic known
to date. Similarly, curves with full rational 2-torsion are also isomorphic to curves
with fast arithmetic and unified addition laws, namely twisted Huff curves [13].
Together, they comprise all ordinary curves with order divisible by 4.
3.3 Mapping to the twist
The previous paragraph suggests that if E is an elliptic curve with order divisible
by 4, then we know an injective encoding to either E(Fq) itself or to its nontrivial
quadratic twist. But we can in fact do better and map to E(Fq) itself.
Indeed, it is classical (see e.g. [16] or [5, Ch. 14]) that Hδc does not only cover
the elliptic curve E′ : v2 = h(u) given by the quotient by σ (using the notations
of the proof of Theorem 2), but also v2 = u3h(1/u) given by the quotient by
στ . Moreover, we have u3h(1/u) = −h(u), so that Hδc /〈στ〉 is the nontrivial
quadratic twist of Eδc .
It is easy to adapt the construction of Theorem 2 to obtain a similar injective
function to Hδc /〈στ〉, and hence a (ν − 1)-injective encoding to the twists of the
curves Eδc . We conclude:
Theorem 4. Let E be an ordinary elliptic curve over a finite field Fq with q ≡ 3
(mod 4), such that 4 divides #E(Fq). Then there is an efficient, efficiently in-
vertible injective encoding to E(Fq) from an interval of cardinality q/2 + O(1)
(i.e. a (ν − 1)-injective encoding, in the terminology of §2.1). Both the encod-
ing and its inverse can be computed with one exponentiation in Fq and a few
multiplications and divisions.
In Appendix A, we give pseudocode for the encoding to and decoding from
E+c . The other cases (viz. E
−
c and the twists of E
±
c ) are treated similarly.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed an efficient injective encoding with almost optimally
large image for a new class of elliptic curves including important examples like
Edwards curves. The only previous construction in that direction was for Hessian
curves.
Note that, from a cryptographic perspective, this does not completely solve
the problem of constructing an encoding for ElGamal encryption, as the curves
we encode to have a small subgroup which can reveal information about the
message (i.e. ElGamal is one-way but not semantically secure in this setting).
This is similar to the situation of ElGamal in multiplicative groups F∗p when p
is not a safe prime. Similarly, since Lindell’s UC commitment scheme works in
prime order groups, our construction is a priori not applicable to that setting.
However, we believe that the possibility of encoding messages as elliptic curve
points can be of sufficient interest to protocol designers that designing around
this cofactor limitation might be worthwhile.
References
1. M. Abe, G. Fuchsbauer, J. Groth, K. Haralambiev, and M. Ohkubo. Structure-
preserving signatures and commitments to group elements. In T. Rabin, editor,
CRYPTO, volume 6223 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 209–236.
Springer, 2010.
2. D. J. Bernstein and T. Lange. Faster addition and doubling on elliptic curves.
In K. Kurosawa, editor, ASIACRYPT, volume 4833 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, pages 29–50. Springer, 2007.
3. E. Bombieri. On exponential sums in finite fields. In Les Tendances Ge´om. en
Alge`bre et The´orie des Nombres, pages 37–41. E´ditions du CNRS, 1966.
4. D. Boneh and M. K. Franklin. Identity-based encryption from the weil pairing. In
J. Kilian, editor, CRYPTO, volume 2139 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
pages 213–229. Springer, 2001.
5. J. Cassels and E. Flynn. Prolegomena to a middlebrow arithmetic of curves of genus
2. Number 230 in London Mathematical Society Lecture Note Series. Cambridge
University Press, 1996.
6. M. Drmota and R. F. Tichy. Sequences, discrepancies and applications. Springer,
1997.
7. T. El Gamal. A public key cryptosystem and a signature scheme based on discrete
logarithms. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 31(4):469–472, 1985.
8. R. R. Farashahi. Hashing into Hessian curves. In A. Nitaj and D. Pointcheval, ed-
itors, AFRICACRYPT, volume 6737 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages
278–289. Springer, 2011.
9. R. R. Farashahi, P.-A. Fouque, I. E. Shparlinski, M. Tibouchi, and J. F. Voloch.
Indifferentiable deterministic hashing to elliptic and hyperelliptic curves. Math.
Comp., 82:491–512, 2013.
10. P.-A. Fouque and M. Tibouchi. Deterministic encoding and hashing to odd hy-
perelliptic curves. In M. Joye, A. Miyaji, and A. Otsuka, editors, Pairing, volume
6487 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 265–277. Springer, 2010.
11. T. Icart. How to hash into elliptic curves. In S. Halevi, editor, CRYPTO, volume
5677 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 303–316. Springer, 2009.
12. A. Joux and V. Vitse. Cover and decomposition index calculus on elliptic curves
made practical. Application to a previously unreachable curve over Fp6 . In
D. Pointcheval and T. Johansson, editors, EUROCRYPT, volume 7237 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science. Springer, 2012.
13. M. Joye, M. Tibouchi, and D. Vergnaud. Huff’s model for elliptic curves. In
G. Hanrot, F. Morain, and E. Thome´, editors, ANTS, volume 6197 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, pages 234–250. Springer, 2010.
14. Y. Lindell. Highly-efficient universally-composable commitments based on the
DDH assumption. In K. G. Paterson, editor, EUROCRYPT, volume 6632 of Lec-
ture Notes in Computer Science, pages 446–466. Springer, 2011.
15. U. M. Maurer. Abstract models of computation in cryptography. In N. P. Smart,
editor, IMA Int. Conf., volume 3796 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages
1–12. Springer, 2005.
16. J. Paulhus. Decomposing Jacobians of curves with extra automorphisms. Acta.
Arith., 132(3):231–244, 2008.
17. A. Shallue and C. van de Woestijne. Construction of rational points on elliptic
curves over finite fields. In F. Hess, S. Pauli, and M. E. Pohst, editors, ANTS,
volume 4076 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 510–524. Springer, 2006.
18. V. Shoup. Lower bounds for discrete logarithms and related problems. In W. Fumy,
editor, EUROCRYPT, volume 1233 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages
256–266. Springer, 1997.
A Pseudocode for the encoding to E+
c
We give formulas for computing the injective encoding to E+c (Fq) both in short
Weierstrass form and in Edwards form. Fix a subset I0 ⊂ Fq\{−1} of cardinality
(q + 1)/2 such that I ∩ (−I) = {0}. We can for example pick I0 = [0, (q − 1)/2]
if q is prime.
Short Weierstrass form. The image (x, y) of u ∈ I0 is obtained with theEncodeE+c
algorithm below, and decoding in carried out with the inverse algorithmDecodeE+c .
1: function Encode
E+c
(u)
2: t← (1− u)/(1 + u)
3: f ← t5 + (c2 + 1/c2) · t3 + t
4: ε← χq(f)
5: α← χq
(
ct+ t3/c
)
6: xH ← ε · t
7: yH ← α ·
√
ε · f
8: uE′ ←
(
1−xH
1+xH
)2
9: vE′ ← yH
(
2
1+xH
)3
10: x← (c+ 1/c)2 · (1− uE′)/4
11: y ← (c+ 1/c)2 · vE′/8
12: return (x, y)
1: function Decode
E+c
(x, y)
2: uE′ ← 1− 4x/(c+ 1/c)2
3: vE′ ← 8y/(c+ 1/c)2
4: uH′ ← √uE′
5: xH ← 1−uH′1+uH′
6: yH ← vE′(1+uH′ )3
7: α← χq
(
cxH + x
3
H/c
)
8: t← α · χq(yH) · xH
9: u← (1− t)/(1 + t)
10: if u 6∈ I0 then
11: u← −u
12: return u
A number of optimizations of these algorithms are possible: for example, the
decoding function only uses the quadratic character of yH , so it is not necessary
to compute yH in full; similarly, one can speed up the first part of the encoding
algorithm by using the implementation techniques from [10] and noticing that
α = χq(c/t+ t/c). Such improvements, however, only marginally affect the run-
ning time, which is dominated in both cases by the square root evaluation, so
we chose to closely follow the steps of §3.1.
Edwards form. Clearly, E+c and E
+
−c are identical curves, so we may assume
without loss of generality that c is of the form 2s2. Then, consider the birational
transformation (X,Y ) 7→ (x, y) given by:
x =
(
c+
1
c
)
1 + Y
1− Y and
y
x
=
c− 1
sX
.
It maps E+c to the curve given by the equation:(
c− 1
sX
)2
= x− 4 +
(
c+
1
c
)2
1
x
2
(c− 1)2
cX2
=
(
c+
1
c
)
·
(
1 + Y
1− Y +
1− Y
1 + Y
)
− 4
(c− 1)2
X2
= (c2 + 1)
1 + Y 2
1− Y 2 − 2c =
(c− 1)2 + (c+ 1)2Y 2
1− Y 2
1− Y 2 = X2 ·
(
1 +
(
c+ 1
c− 1
)2
Y 2
)
which is exactly the Edwards curve Ed : X
2 + Y 2 = 1 + dX2Y 2 for:
d = −
(
c+ 1
c− 1
)2
.
Since we constrained c to be of the form 2s2, this shows that about half of all
Edwards curves Ed with non square d are isomorphic to some E
+
c (the other half
being isomorphic to the twists of those).
We can easily encode to and decode from Ed(Fq) using the birational trans-
formation described above. This gives the following algorithms.
1: function EncodeEd(u)
2: (x, y)← Encode
E+c
(u)
3: X ← c−1
s
· x
y
4: Y ← x+c+1/c
x−c−1/c
5: return (X,Y )
1: function DecodeEd(X,Y )
2: x← (c+ 1/c) · 1+Y
1−Y
3: y ← c−1
s
· x
X
4: u← Decode
E+c
(x, y)
5: return u
